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The Big Stick Split in Two:
Roosevelt vs. Hay on
the Anglo-American Relationship
William Shirey
In 1895, the United States and Great Britain found
themselves in a state of crisis over a British intervention in
Venezuela that had been sparked by a disagreement over the
Venezuela-British Guiana border. Most American political elites
sought to solve the issue by arbitration; many academic elites
wished for their government to be as conciliatory as possible.
During the crisis, a half-cowboy-half-politician named Theodore
Roosevelt, then a candidate for the New York City mayoralty,
wrote a letter to his alma mater’s newspaper stating his thoughts
on the international debate in no uncertain terms: there was no
time now, Roosevelt declared, for “stock-jobbing timidity” or “the
Baboo kind of statesmanship,” nor was there any time for those
who were “still intellectually in a state of colonial dependence
on England.” The United States, according to Roosevelt, should
insist upon the Monroe Doctrine in its fullest application, and,
for good measure, “build a really first-class Navy.”1 Yet according
to most historians, within two decades, Theodore Roosevelt
had played a significant if not determinative role in laying the
foundation for the Anglo-American “special relationship” that
carried the two nations through the world wars.
Frederick W. Marks III, in his 1979 book Velvet on Iron: The
Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt, posits that “[Roosevelt] liquidated
virtually every object of discord between the two countries and
would probably have sought a more formal tie had he not feared
the veto power of German and Irish-American voters.” Marks
argues that Roosevelt’s seemingly cool attitude toward Britain
was concealing his true desire, Anglo-American partnership, for
the sake of political prudence in a largely Anglophobic country.2
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The main scholar of Theodore Roosevelt’s relationship
with Great Britain, William N. Tilchin, argues that Roosevelt
combined his own bombastic nationalism with a pro-British
attitude, a sentiment he held because of the cultural affinities
between American and British societies as well as his cherished
relationships with British statesmen such as Cecil Spring-Rice,
the best man at his second wedding. Tilchin writes that, from
his grand geostrategic considerations down to his handling of
minor details, Roosevelt played a pivotal role in nurturing AngloAmerican relations.3
Howard K. Beale, the deliverer of a prolific set of
lectures on Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy at Johns
Hopkins University and the author of perhaps the most-cited
work on the subject, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to
World Power, argues that Roosevelt and his ardent companion
Henry Cabot Lodge were indeed cold (if not somewhat hostile)
toward the British in the early 1890s, but grew friendlier as
their careers progressed. This friendliness grew, his narrative
goes, after the Spanish-American War, when Britain refrained
from censuring America like the other European powers.4 After
describing Roosevelt’s fury toward Britain’s aforementioned
incursion upon the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela, Beale posits
that by 1898 Roosevelt had “developed a full-blown foreign
policy based on the belief that the British and Americans shared
common interests.”5 Beale propounds a view of Roosevelt’s
actions toward Great Britain that he dubbed “the cementing of
an Anglo-American entente”; in other words, Roosevelt helped
consummate an informal but mutually understood relationship
of diplomatic solidarity with Britain. His analysis is colored by the
fact that Roosevelt “played England’s game” in the conferences
and diplomatic skirmishes that led to the First World War.6
Scarce dissent is to be found on Theodore Roosevelt’s
general affinity for England and his playing a major role in
the building of the Anglo-American entente. Indeed, England
and America began to deliberately form a friendly diplomatic
Penn History Review

103

The Big Stick Split in Two

relationship beginning, at the latest estimate, in 1900, when Lord
Lansdowne became the British secretary of state for foreign
affairs.7 Furthermore, it is plain that Roosevelt had a respect for
the affinities between American and British culture and that he
had dear British friends in important diplomatic roles.
But the trend from wariness to entente in BritishAmerican relations was more a British phenomenon than an
American one; the respect that Roosevelt found for British
culture was not meaningfully different from the respect that he
found for other nations as disparate as Russia, Germany, and
Japan. Similarly, though Roosevelt’s greatest foreign friends were
indeed British, he surrounded himself with an international
coterie of Englishmen, Germans, Frenchmen, Japanese, and
Russians with whom he shared an immense mutual fondness.8
Yet one must go back to 1957 in order to find a historian who
credits the strengthening of the bonds between England and
America not to Theodore Roosevelt himself, but to people like
John Hay, Lord Pauncefote, Henry White, or the general foreign
policy establishments of England and America, or even to the
mutual enmity toward Germany from both countries.9
The historical facts, upon closer examination, cast the
general conclusion of historians like Marks, Tilchin, Beale, and
others in a suspicious light. Historical episodes involving both
the United States and Britain reveal that Roosevelt was, even after
1898, often blatantly anti-British, while in fact other Republican
actors worked to pacify Washington’s dealings with London.
The general historical consensus thus fails to recognize that a
diplomatic and political corps whose ideologies and affinities
differed from Roosevelt’s levied a crucial influence on the actual
comportment of his administration. In addition to obscuring
the importance of other Republican policymakers, the historical
consensus regarding Roosevelt’s foreign policy interprets his
actions anachronistically through the screen of the world wars,
attempting either to ascribe to him a foresight that he did
not possess, or to fit him into a facile teleology of America’s
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seemingly inexorable entente with Britain while ignoring the
contingencies of that relationship. No history has adequately
explained Roosevelt’s role in Anglo-American relations without
falling into these traps of faulty historical reasoning.10
hIstorIcAl BAckground:
BrItAIn, europe, And the unIted stAtes
Britain, from at least the termination of her disastrous
effort in the Second Boer War, had been in need of a new
geopolitical approach. Before the imperial boom of the 1870s
and 1880s, only Britain had anything more than a toehold in the
wider world. Once the other European powers—save AustriaHungary—crashed into Africa and Asia, Britain’s comparative
naval and financial advantage began to wither. In the late 1890s,
the British fought their disastrously long war in southern
Africa against the Boers for three years, seriously draining their
resources and their morale; at the same time, Britain and France
nearly collided on their imperial frontiers. Under Kaiser Wilhelm
II and Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Germany began the
construction of a “risk fleet” to compete with the Royal Navy
in the late 1890s, a clear threat against Britain’s traditional
dominance on the sea.
The British realized that the “splendid isolation”—in
actuality, unilateralism—that they had practiced for decades was
no longer viable in an increasingly multipolar world order. Prime
Minister Lord Salisbury, the last great lion of British conservative
statecraft and a staunch supporter of unilateralism, left office in
1902. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Lansdowne
had been working since 1900 on broadening Britain’s friendships
and minimizing the number of her enemies, a task that became
easier when Salisbury could impede him no longer. Although
Lansdowne’s attempted overtures to Berlin were fruitless, the
British successfully formed a naval compact with Japan in 1902,
an “entente cordiale” with France in 1904, and a triple entente
Penn History Review
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with France and Russia in 1907.
Before all of this, however, Britain had made diplomatic
overtures to the United States, even though many northern
American statesmen—Senator Lodge foremost among them—
publicly conveyed their detestation of both Britain’s antagonism
toward American control of Hawaii and her stringent upholding
of Canadian fishing rights. Nevertheless, the path to an unofficial
Anglo-American entente was paved by Britain’s hostility
toward Spain in 1898; the relationship was slowly brought
to its consummation as Britain brought garrisons back from
Canada. The British at this time were also beginning to negotiate
over recognizing at least partial American rights to the future
Isthmian canal—and was, therefore, tacitly toying with allowing
full American dominance in the Western Hemisphere.
The diplomatic behavior of the United States was going
through a set of changes at the turn of the century as well, perhaps
even more profound changes than Lansdowne was to make in
Britain. In 1898, the United States crashed onto the world scene
in the Spanish-American War, taking the Philippines and other
colonies. Roosevelt and his fellow “imperialist” Republicans
such as Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, and—though he only
influenced policy indirectly—the historian Alfred Thayer Mahan
had been working their way up the ranks of the Washington elite
during the preceding decade, and by the late 1890s they were
influencing naval affairs, the State Department, and the Senate.
These men developed what Henry Cabot Lodge called the “Large
Policy,” meaning worldwide American assertion. The Large
Policy finally found its way into the Oval Office when Theodore
Roosevelt assumed the presidency after the assassination of
William McKinley in 1901.
The expansions, different as they were, of both Britain
and the United States throughout the globe were in part
subtended by cultural assumptions of civilizational superiority.
These assumptions were the product of both Enlightenment
thought and retroactive justifications of colonial control and
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displacement.11 In the U.S., the Republican Party and progressive
elites peddled imperial expansion in the lead-up to the SpanishAmerican War as synonymous with national honor; dominance
in the Western Hemisphere became, therefore, an imperative for
the sake of civilization and Christendom.12 Furthermore, not
only did the British end up ceding hemispheric dominance to the
United States for pragmatic reasons during this period, but they
also held the selfsame cultural assumptions that made it appear
valid. That published works of fiction, philosophy, and social
and political thought began to flow in sharply increased volume
between the U.S. and her motherland during the dawning hours
of joint Anglophone global dominance was no coincidence.13
England was reaching out for friends and allies at the
same time that the United States began to seriously exert its
power throughout the world; the friendship was, in a sense,
natural. (German Weltpolitik had seemed always to stand athwart
America’s aims at expansion; by virtue of the Anglo-German naval
race and general rivalry, then, British and American diplomatic
goals of the late nineteenth century found a somewhat organic
alignment.) The historiographical consensus is that Roosevelt
played a positive role in bringing about this alignment, which
facilitated Anglo-American cooperation during both world
wars. Among major historians on the subject, Howard Beale has
the most generous view on when Roosevelt began to seriously
cooperate with the British. By 1898, Beale argues, Roosevelt was
basing his foreign policy on the palpable necessity of the AngloAmerican understanding.14
Yet Roosevelt, rather than favoring Britain categorically
over Germany or other European powers, was far more erratic
than historians have acknowledged. He was friendly toward the
diplomats of Downing Street when Britain stood to advance
American interests, but he could be shockingly pugnacious
whenever Britain posed even a minimal threat to America’s
geopolitical goals. Besides the latent trend that made an AngloAmerican understanding propitious at the turn of the century,
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it was Roosevelt’s diplomatic corps, including his Anglophilic
Secretary of State John Hay, that truly made an effort to build
the Anglo-American relationship that came to define later
decades. The clearest case of the tension between the rabid
“pro-American” style of Roosevelt and the Anglophilia of
Hay and the State Department—and the importance of the
structural trend of Anglo-American friendship—can be seen in
the Alaskan boundary dispute of the early 1900s.
hAy And choAte In cAnAdA
By the end of the nineteenth century, the spheres of
both British Canada and the United States were growing; by the
1890s, they were bumping into each other. Roosevelt’s “proAmericanism” reached a fever pitch in the face of this ever-somild and indirect abrasion between America and the Imperial
Parliament at Westminster, which controlled Canadian foreign
affairs at the time. In 1895, two years after a dispute between
the British and the Americans over fisheries in the Bering Sea
had been resolved by arbitration, then-New York City Police
Commissioner Roosevelt wrote to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge
to say that “Great Britain’s conduct about the seals is infamous…
[we should] seize all Canadian sailors as pirates.”15 Roosevelt also
expressed his wish to invade Canada as punishment for Britain’s
half-violation of the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela. In late 1895,
he wrote: “Let the fight come if it must; I don’t care whether our
sea coast cities are bombarded or not; we would take Canada.”16
(The Americans would most emphatically not have taken Canada;
at the time of Roosevelt’s letter, Great Britain had fifty available
battleships in the northern Pacific to America’s three).17
Canadian-American—and, by extension, BritishAmerican—friction ebbed after 1895. The British Admiralty
continued to worry about both American and German naval
ambitions in the North Pacific, but the Anglo-Japanese
agreement of 1902 eventually diminished the fears.18 Downing
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Street recognized that, in the event of a war with the United
States in the coming decades, British ships would ineluctably be
batted away from Canada’s Atlantic coast and the St. Lawrence
by the up-and-coming United States, which had established
its Naval War College in 1884 and come under the leadership
of a fire-breathing naval advocate in Roosevelt. Aside from a
small fleet of submarines, the British abandoned their military
presence in the Western Hemisphere, preferring to count on
diplomatic courtship of the Americans and the loyalty of the
Canadians.19 Still, the tension between America’s increasingly
positive relations with Britain and America’s increasingly strained
relationship with British Canada was the dialectic that defined
the Anglo-American understanding in its infant stages.
The year 1900 saw the beginning of the Alaskan
boundary question. According to the 1825 treaty that demarcated
the boundary between Alaska and Canada, the line of separation
was to “follow the summit of the mountains parallel to the
coast” north of the Portland Channel. Yet the language was far
too vague to draw an actual line, and an exact boundary had not
been established.20 It is in fact unclear whether or not a mountain
summit line parallel to the coast even exists. The treaty also
included the phrase “winding of the coast” and referred to the
“Portland channel” at points crucial for its own interpretation,
neither of which is an obvious feature based on geography alone,
and neither of which had been previously defined. The British/
Canadians and the Americans each claimed two different lines
that ran approximately northwest-southeast along the coast.
Crucially, each side claimed control of a pass over the Lynn
Canal, the key spot which controlled the headwaters and allowed
for all riverboat transport in the area.21
When gold was discovered in the Yukon in the 1890s,
the Canadians pressed their claim for territories that were
left ambiguous by the treaty. In January 1900, the American
ambassador to London, Joseph Choate, made it clear that the
United States would agree to an arbitrative tribunal on the matter.
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Lansdowne, wishing to be as conciliatory as possible toward
the Americans while still keeping the Canadians happy, saw
the question as an unnecessary roadblock to an entente.22 With
discussions between London and Washington about the nature
of the future Isthmian canal becoming more serious by the
week, the Alaskan boundary dispute became a major bargaining
chip for both sides. As it was the most emotionally charged issue
dividing the British and the Americans and was tightly linked
to the future of transportation, trade, and naval power in the
Western Hemisphere, the topic of Alaska’s boundary was the sine
qua non of Anglo-American rapprochement.23
Secretary of State John Hay sent a drafted proposal
for the tribunal to Julian Pauncefote, envoy extraordinary and

The Lynn Canal and the Skagway River.
A gold discovery in the area would bring the United States and the British
Empire into a pivotal near-confrontation.
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minister plenipotentiary to the United States. The British were
initially surprised and satisfied, but Pauncefote reported that the
judges would have very little interpretive power outside of the
1825 treaty, which was firmly in the United States’ favor. Canada
and Governor-General Minto were at first “delighted,” but on
further consideration of the precise terms, they considered the
United States’ proposal “most insidious.”24
Secretary Hay, as historians have noted and as was clear
to his contemporaries, was willing and eager to bend U.S. policy
in England’s direction. “In sum,” comments one Hay biographer,
“under Hay’s direction, American neutrality was distinctly
benevolent to England.”25 In the Alaskan situation, however, an
American interest was directly involved. Once Roosevelt was in
office, Hay could not nakedly alter U.S. policy to favor England,
even though (as will be shown) he disagreed with President
Roosevelt’s tacit idea that American claims in Alaska were more
important than the prospective relationship between Washington
and London.26 His willingness to arrange an arbitration only
served to put him on thin ice as secretary of state. As Roosevelt
would recall after Hay’s death, he was simply “not to be trusted
on issues concerning England”—and, as an important corollary,
he was “foolishly distrustful of the Germans.”27
Fortunately for the Americans, a canal treaty with England
was in its final stages and Lansdowne was determined not to
jeopardize it. Lansdowne’s secretary wrote to his counterparts in
the British Colonial Office that Lansdowne wished
that the communications to the Dominion
Government should not in any way imply that His
Majesty’s Government associate the settlement
of the Alaskan Boundary and other primarily
Canadian questions with that of the Interoceanic
Canal question, or that the negotiations for the…
Treaties are interdependent.28
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Lansdowne and Hay, therefore, were committed to an amicable
resolution of the issue. It was Roosevelt who stood as an inhibitor
of the trend toward conciliation.
hAy vs. roosevelt In cAnAdA
Canada already stood on shaky legal ground. That her
mother country of England was unwilling to throw weight
behind the Alaskan issue only worsened her hopeless situation.
The British, as Canadian Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier knew,
would frown upon any further obstructive tactics he used.29
Thus Laurier, in January 1902, decided to arbitrate.30 Hay and
those at the British Foreign Office were delighted that this
source of friction between Washington and London would soon
be removed.
But the events of the previous September—the
assassination of William McKinley and the inauguration of
Theodore Roosevelt as president of the United States—had
introduced a great deal of volatility into America’s cooperation
on the Alaskan issue. Roosevelt immediately made clear his
opposition to any such arbitration as had been tentatively
approved by the Canadians, the British, and Hay. In March 1902,
a crestfallen Pauncefote told Lansdowne that “the President
considers the claim of the United States is so manifestly clear
and unanswerable that he is not disposed to run the risk of
sacrificing American territory under a compromise that is the
almost certain result of an arbitration.”31 Roosevelt, according to
Henry Cabot Lodge, had posited in the presence of two senators
that at the first sign of trouble in the disputed territory he would
send United States troops to occupy it. One of the two senators
intimated that this would be a popular decision among both
members of Congress and the people.32
Secretary of State Hay pushed the reluctant Joseph
Choate to enter private discussions at the British Foreign
Office despite Roosevelt’s heated opposition toward anything
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resembling arbitration. Choate noted that the British and
Canadians were indeed open to significant compromise. In
August 1902, Lansdowne had suggested to Choate that the
United States could even determine the format and style of an
arbitration if it were to take place.33 The significance of Hay’s
apparent dismissal of Roosevelt’s hawkishness on this issue is
often overlooked in the later historiography.34
In September 1902, Lansdowne sent Sir Michael Herbert,
a friend of Roosevelt’s, to Washington as ambassador to the
United States. Roosevelt gave him a warm reception but made it
clear that he wished to move immediately ahead with the Alaskan
issue. The president suggested, during his first interview with
the new ambassador, that he might accept an Anglo-American
jurist tribunal that carried no formal weight. Instead, it would
be made up of jurists selected by the American and British
governments. The Canadian government gave its tentative assent
on November 18. Said the Governor-General of Canada, “My
ministers would be disposed to consider it favorably, provided
that the reference to a Tribunal should include all aspects of
the question.” Lansdowne told Hay that the British, too,
would agree.35 Roosevelt’s grudging acceptance of Hay’s initial
arbitrative idea could be put into effect because Lansdowne was
willing to cooperate and because Hay had used his influence to
grease the skids for peaceful diplomacy.
The Alaskan issue was primarily seen as one between
Britain and America, not as one between British Canada and
America or some combination of the three. Hay, in predictable
if absurd Anglophilic fashion, wished to see only one American
on the commission of six jurists. Herbert wished to see three
Americans and three Britons, leaving out any Canadians.36 This
was no small source of friction between Canada and her imperial
motherland. Laurier, in January 1903, once again publicly
criticized the Americans for their position and actions regarding
the Alaska treaty. He would have rather had the issue submitted
to The Hague than to what he increasingly saw as a clearly biased
Penn History Review
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Anglo-American old boys’ club.37
Herbert and some British diplomats began to dream
of some sort of Anglo-American supreme court, while other
elder British statesmen were more cautious of the Americans.38
But Herbert, Hay, and Lansdowne were the central players in
the Alaskan boundary issue, and their wish for Anglo-American
friendship superseded Roosevelt’s demand of the satisfaction of
American interests on one hand and British colonial relations
on the other. In Canada, Minto and Laurier recognized their
helplessness and on January 21 assented to a tribunal of six
impartial jurists. Two days later, King Edward VII gave his
blessing.39
In the U.S., representatives from the northwestern states
put up a fight. They believed that ceding to Canada what was
not Canada’s would endanger their own states; they asserted that
there were no legal grounds on which the Canadians could stand

Secretary of State John Hay, c. 1904.
The unsung hero of the Anglo-American relationship, but to Roosevelt,
“not to be trusted on issues concerning England” and
“foolishly distrustful of the Germans.”
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and that even deigning to arbitrate was a farce on the part of
the United States. Those Americans who favored the arbitration
declared that no matter what the tribunal said, no territory would
be lost to Canada. Despite the protestations of the Northwest
(whose states were the most anti-Canadian of all) and the
constant, truculent “pro-Americanism” of the president, the
treaty passed the Senate on February 11 and cleared the path for
negotiations to take place.40
The international table was set for the pacification of the
Alaskan issue. Hay, Herbert, and Lansdowne had ensured AngloAmerican friendship, and the Canadians’ complaints seemed to
have been sacrificed for the sake of placating the Americans.
Even so, Theodore Roosevelt and his pro-Americanism found a
way to make trouble. On February 18, 1903, Roosevelt appointed
three of the most grossly biased politicians in all America as his
“impartial” jurists: Secretary of War (and longtime Roosevelt
man) Elihu Root; Senator George Turner of the anti-Canadian
state of Washington; and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, progenitor
of the “Large Policy” and Roosevelt’s most steadfast political
partner.41 When the inevitable outrage came, the pathetic
American excuse was that three unbiased judges could not be
found. This, of course, did little to quell the anger.42 Herbert
declared himself severely disheartened and disillusioned with the
Americans.43
Lansdowne was disappointed but still hoped for
accommodation over anger. Britain had just terminated its
involvement in the Anglo-German blockade of Venezuela on
February 14, and the blockade had caused Roosevelt’s animal
Americanism to come frightfully to the fore. The president—
perhaps by coincidence, but more likely not—had ordered the
admiral of the navy to practice naval maneuvers on what was
then the largest scale in American history in the same theater as
the Anglo-German blockade.44 Now was simply not the time for
the British to anger the rough-riding Roosevelt. Herbert, too,
fully comprehended the strength of American feeling about what
Penn History Review
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was seen as Britain’s bad faith. He sent notes on February 23 to
Ottawa and London urging amicability and a quick conclusion.45
The will of the Canadians would not be allowed to obstruct the
rapprochement of the English and the Americans.
The Canadians, angered at once by the Americans for
their preposterous choice of “impartial” jurists and by the British
for their appeasement of Roosevelt’s bullish Americanism,
“felt called upon not only to express their dissatisfaction at
the recent exchange of ratifications at Washington before their
official consent had been given, but practically to indicate that
their assent had been rendered unavoidable by His Majesty’s
Government.”46 Lansdowne, struggling between the rock of
Anglo-American amity and its import and the hard place of
Britain’s colonial obligations, was forced to ask the Americans
for two delays in the tribunal to allow the Canadians to gather the
necessary documents. Hay was also trying to reconcile his own
intense, fundamental affinity for the British with the fact that
he was the secretary of state of the United States of America.
Hay expressed disappointment at what he saw as stalling tactics.
Roosevelt asserted to Hay a duty:
If the English decline to come to an agreement
this fall, under any pretense, I shall feel that it
is simply due to bad faith—that they have no
sincere desire to settle the matter equitably. I
think they ought to be made to understand that
there must be no delay; that we have come to
a definite agreement with them and that the
agreement must be kept on their side as well as
on ours, and that we shall expect them to live up
to it without fail…I shall probably, if they fail to
come to an agreement, recite our case in the message
to Congress and ask for an appropriation so that we may
run the line ourselves.47
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Yet Hay was not the only member of the American
foreign policy establishment to receive word from Roosevelt in
these terms. On June 29, Roosevelt wrote Lodge to say that, if
the British continued to make things difficult, he would “declare
the negotiations off, recite our case in the message to Congress,
and ask for an appropriation to run the boundary as we deem it
should be run.”48 To Hay on July 29, he stated that “if we can’t
come to an agreement now nothing will be left but to act in a way
which will necessarily wound British pride.”49 To Root on August
20, Roosevelt expressed his hope that the “the British will see
reason. If they do not, it will be unpleasant for us, but it will be
far more unpleasant for Great Britain and Canada.”50 To Hay on
September 21, Roosevelt stated that he was wondering
if the Jacks realize that…it will be far more
unpleasant to them, if they force the alternative
upon us; if we simply announce that the country
is ours and will remain so, and that so far as it has
not been reduced to possession it will be reduced
to possession, and that no further negotiations in
the matter will be entertained.51
Other letters of Roosevelt’s indicate even more explicitly
his proclivity to use state force to resolve the issue. To Henry
White on September 26, Roosevelt wrote that
I should be obliged to treat the territory as ours,
as being for the most part in our possession,
and the remainder to be reduced to possession
as soon as in our judgment it was advisable—
and to declare furthermore that no additional
negotiations of any kind would be entered into.52
To Elihu Root on August 8, the president wrote how he “shall
at once establish posts on the islands and sufficiently far up the
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main streams to reduce at all the essential points our claim to
actual occupancy…This will not be pleasant to do and it will be
still less pleasant for the English.”53 To Frederick Jackson Turner
on August 8, he stated that in case of “captious objections on the
part of the English, I am going to send a brigade of American
regulars up to Skagway and take possession of the disputed
territory and hold it by all the power and force of the United
States.”54
Roosevelt was playing fast and loose, and the British saw
that he would risk severely harming the budding relationship
between England and America for the sake of a small strip of
land in a barely inhabitable area bearing trace amounts of gold.
Fortunately for the sake of smooth Anglo-American relations
at this critical stage, Hay and the British statesmen kept cool
heads and paved the way for London and Washington to get

Theodore Roosevelt in his presidential years.
A pugnacious pro-American: “I am going to send a brigade of American
regulars up to Skagway and take possession of the disputed territory and hold
it by all the power and force of the United States.”
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along. Joseph Chamberlain, then British secretary of state for
the colonies, had been spooked enough by Roosevelt. He too
resolved to quickly settle the Alaskan issue no matter the cost to
Canada and the empire.55
The negotiations began in September. According to
Lord Alverstone, the British representative at the tribunal, the
Americans behaved badly, but he wished to put up a fight. On
several issues concerning the dispute he remained unwaveringly
set against all that the United States wished to do. An abrupt
turnaround in early October was likely the result of pressure from
Lansdowne (who was in turn feeling pressure from Roosevelt)
toward conciliation on the part of the British.56 The Americans
came out with a total victory; Roosevelt and the three jurists
were met with wide acclaim for what was seen as an enormous
diplomatic win. The Canadians were fittingly resentful and knew
that all injuries to Canada were being sustained for the sake of
British friendship with America.57
But it was Hay, not Roosevelt, who worked for diplomacy
surrounding the Canada issue. It is difficult to imagine a scenario
where Anglo-American amity would have remained on a smoothly
upward ascent without Secretary Hay tempering the Roosevelt
administration’s response. Roosevelt’s truculence, in actual fact,
threatened significant setbacks to Anglo-American amity on
multiple occasions; it brought Lansdowne and his enormously
conciliatory attitude to his wit’s end. Hay’s Anglophilia and
Lansdowne’s determination to end Britain’s “splendid isolation”
were the determining factors that allowed the Anglo-American
understanding to progress despite the Alaskan boundary conflict.
Roosevelt was, realistically, a liability throughout the resolution
of this dispute.
lIMItAtIons And IMplIcAtIons
Roosevelt and Hay’s respective roles in the Alaskan crisis
should bring the historical consensus regarding Roosevelt’s
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relationship with Britain under much harsher scrutiny. Yet a far
more thorough analysis of the diplomatic episodes throughout
Roosevelt’s career is needed to establish precisely when Roosevelt
became more disposed to treating the Anglo-American entente as
a serious diplomatic goal. These analyses must rely on explorations
of the attitudes of Roosevelt’s fellow American diplomats and
policymakers, as the Alaskan boundary case shows that perhaps
they were the authors of the Anglo-American rapprochement that
undeniably took place between 1895 and 1917. (Tantalizing leads
for such an analysis exist: Roosevelt left much of his East Asian
diplomacy to Secretary Hay until his death in 1905, and Hay, in
a remarkable suspension of logic fitting only the most ferocious
of Anglophiles, attempted to blame the Russo-Japanese conflict
on Germany, then clearly Britain’s nemesis. Roosevelt, on the
other hand, at one point attempted to blame Japanese aggression
on Britain, also a plain twist of the reality on the ground.) In any
case, a fuller exposition of Roosevelt’s potentially more neutral
attitude toward Britain—as opposed to the palpable Anglophilia
of other Republicans of his time, like that of John Hay, Alfred
Thayer Mahan, and Henry White—must explain the fact that
Roosevelt seemed to favor Britain in his later diplomacy.
The Alaskan boundary dispute does not conclude
the inquiry into Teddy Roosevelt’s views on Great Britain
or the evolution of those views, but it does destabilize the
historiographical consensus that Roosevelt was, in his personal
thought, a friend to Britain—or that he had become a friend
to Britain by 1898. That others in the Republican Party of
Roosevelt’s time—most importantly, Secretary of State John
Hay—were indeed Anglophilic has created the illusion that
Roosevelt himself was pro-Britain, whereas, in fact, until at least
the early 1900s, Roosevelt was in fact something of a practical (if
absurdly feisty) “pro-American” situated in a largely pro-Britain
party and administration. Secretary Hay, in the case of the Alaskan
boundary, was not tightly managed by Roosevelt with regard to
diplomatic actions and, as illustrated above, would sometimes
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go against the wishes of his president. Despite Roosevelt later
denying that Hay was a major player in the boundary dispute, it
was indeed Hay who curbed Roosevelt’s dangerous influence on
the situation, made the necessary diplomatic maneuvers, took
advantage of the British retreat from “splendid isolation,” and
allowed the conflict to come to its peaceful resolution.
The case study above has implications for the debate that
runs through the literature on the appropriate characterization
of Roosevelt’s foreign policy in the grandest sense. Some
scholars, most famously Henry Kissinger, have argued that
Theodore Roosevelt can be most accurately be described as an
American realpolitiker, always thinking systemically and globally
while at the same time remaining conscious of the balance of
power.58 Historian Walter McDougall also projects some degree
of realism and balance-consciousness onto Roosevelt, although
McDougall’s narrative is far more nuanced than Kissinger’s and is
informed by the fact that the extant “Progressivism” at the turn
of the century was a fundamental aspect of the Rooseveltian
worldview.59 Howard Beale also portrays Roosevelt as seeing the
world chiefly through the lens of power.60 Others have disagreed
sharply with the realist school of analysis. Frank Ninkovich in
his book American Imperialism argues that a structural, cultural,
and intellectual moment was the plinth upon which American
expansion in the Edwardian era stood, while William C. Widenor
and John Milton Cooper Jr. have in tandem argued that Roosevelt
and Lodge were in fact more idealistic than Woodrow Wilson
and William Jennings Bryan, due to the “Large Policy” group’s
Lamarckian and neo-Darwinian assumptions, their (arguably)
more overt racial paternalism, and their near-worship of the
militaristic spirit.61
The clearest example of the anti-realist view of
Roosevelt’s foreign policy is Frank Ninkovich’s article “Theodore
Roosevelt: Civilization as Ideology,” where Ninkovich asserts
that Roosevelt’s diplomatic thought and behavior was driven
primarily and fundamentally by an idealization of “civilization”
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informed by a “metahistorical outlook” of a sort of soupedup Whig history.62 Citing Roosevelt’s praise of imperialism, his
efforts to form diplomatic ties with European nations, and his
tendency to try to be on the “civilized” side of conflicts abroad,
Ninkovich portrays Roosevelt as a blind ideologue, one who saw
himself as having, above all else, a “duty upon the civilized races
to transplant the seeds of civilization where they had failed to
germinate of their own accord.”63
Ninkovich’s article is unconvincing. A disproportionately
large amount of the primary source material used by Ninkovich to
create his narrative is made up of letters to high-ranking foreign
officials, texts of public speeches, or articles in widely circulated
magazines—all discursive scenarios in which any president or
diplomat might justify his actions in the most high-minded
light. While Ninkovich’s argument in American Imperialism, which
places Roosevelt’s actions in their proper intellectual and cultural
context, is a welcome tonic to Kissinger’s retrojection of latertwentieth century American realism onto Roosevelt, his selective
and tenuous material for “Civilization as Ideology” causes him
to miss the mark. Ninkovich’s “civilizational” framework is
excellent for Roosevelt’s approach to, for example, Latin America,
but is unequipped to handle the looming and central diplomatic
question of Roosevelt’s presidency: how the United States
should navigate the increasingly dire Anglo-German rivalry. It
is no wonder that Ninkovich’s article only dares to approach the
question of Roosevelt’s ideas on U.S.-German relations after the
point that the German war machine brutalized Belgium, five
years after Roosevelt had left office.64
The Alaskan boundary issue seems to show that
Roosevelt’s self-proclaimed “pro-Americanism” manifested
itself as a short-term explosiveness, inimical both to calculated,
systematic, balance-of-power realism and to high-minded
normative ideas of “civilization.” Roosevelt’s actions, when
examined closely, cannot fit on any facile midpoint between the
two. Furthermore, it seems that the steady hands in American
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foreign policy were in Roosevelt’s administration. The emphasis
ought to be taken away from Roosevelt the man, and a responsible
evaluation of U.S. diplomacy from 1901 to 1909 should not
attribute successes blindly to the president but rather take into
account the efforts of Hay, White, Root, and others who worked
to set policy and tame the wild man in the White House.
The question of Roosevelt’s role in the informal, loose
drawing together of the United States and Britain also engages a
hotly debated topic in the theory of international relations: the
degree to which leadership matters in statecraft and diplomacy.
Most in the field of international relations implicitly or explicitly
work with the idea that looking at structural, impersonal forces,
along with culture, bureaucracy, and political systems, is the
appropriate method by which to understand diplomacy and
history. This is not an uncontested idea: Daniel Byman and
Kenneth Pollack, for example, have asserted that even small
idiosyncrasies of leaders can have a profound impact on the
course of history—that the human element is a significant
variable. They defend their thesis on a theoretical level, positing
that state intentions—often tied up with specific leaders’
intentions—are germane to theories of international relations;
they ground their idea in case studies as well.65
Within the debate of leadership vs. structural causes in
international relations theory, Robert Jervis engages with the
tension between leaders and advisors. Jervis argues that political
role can be a determinative force in the intentions of different
actors, though Jervis himself is somewhat ambivalent about
the extent to which structural forces dominate personal forces
in statecraft.66 The president, Jervis’s argument goes, will face
political pressures, while a secretary of state like Hay will be freer
of electoral constraints. Jervis’s thesis is a powerful explanation
of the dynamics of the Roosevelt administration during the
Alaskan boundary crisis. Yet Roosevelt’s personality—along
with the residue of his previous tepidness regarding Britain—
most certainly was a factor in how he behaved, in addition to the
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presidential pressure he faced. Similarly, Hay’s well-documented
Anglophilia was a factor in his comportment along with his
position at the State Department.
Even if structural factors were among the ultimate
causes of the Anglo-American rapprochement, to ignore the
role of leaders—especially particularly influential ones, like
Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay, or Lansdowne—is dangerous
and reductive.67 Matters of international relations and diplomatic
history are too complex to focus only on any one element;
biography and psychology must be explored as much as political
systems and international structures. The historiography on
Theodore Roosevelt’s own tastes and predilections regarding
diplomacy has crucially ignored evidence of his own ambivalentat-best attitude toward Great Britain, and Roosevelt’s very
persona is far from unimportant in this analysis. The AngloAmerican entente steadied both nations before the coming
collapse of world order, and the causes of that entente—not
only those distal and impersonal, but also those proximate and
personal—deserve painstaking attention.
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